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Research and development is largely done by multinationals (MNEs) that transfer 
technology to their foreign subsidiaries. Trust might be an important determinant of the 
governance of technology transfers because trust can reduce the dependence of the subsidiary 
on the headquarters. We empirically investigate how widely held perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of the host economy influence international technology transfers that 
subsidiaries receive from their business group or from other international providers. We use 
firm-level data on R&D imports from foreign subsidiaries operating in Spain for the period 
2005 to 2012, and a Eurobarometer measure of trust between citizens of European countries. 
We find that subsidiaries that belong to MNEs from countries with higher trust in Spaniards 
have fewer technology transfers within the business group and more from international market 
channels than subsidiaries from countries with lower trust in Spaniards. Our results support 
predictions of transaction cost economics about how technology transfers are organized. 
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1. Introduction  
There is ample evidence on the positive effect of trust on economic growth and 
development (La Porta et al., 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Dearmon 
and Grier, 2009; Guiso et al., 2008). One mechanism for the positive effect of trust on growth 
is that trust positively influences international transfers of technology, which in turn can 
enhance productivity and growth in the host economy (Eaton and Kortum, 1996; Keller, 
2004). In this paper, we investigate this mechanism. We focus on the international technology 
transfers that subsidiaries receive from their business group and from other foreign providers. 
Multinationals (MNEs) are key drivers of innovations and are responsible for a large number 
of technology transfers (Markusen, 1984; Branstetter et al., 2006; Bertrand, 2009; Criscuolo 
et al., 2010). Therefore, understanding the nature of technology transfers from MNEs is of 
great economic relevance.  
Our specific contribution is to examine whether the trustworthy environment in which 
multinationals and their foreign subsidiaries operate impacts the intensity of within-group and 
through-market international technology transfers. The hypothesis that trust might reduce 
within-firm transactions and increase market channel flows goes back to Williamson (1971). 
According to Williamson, “vertical integration would be more complete in a low-trust than a 
high-trust culture, ceteris paribus” (p. 122). There is evidence that subsidiaries that operate in 
environments perceived as less trustworthy might be more dependent on the headquarters than 
subsidiaries operating in highly trusted environments (Bloom et al., 2012). And as a 
consequence, they will receive more technology transfers from within the business group and 
fewer technological services from international market channels.  
To shed light on the role of trust for international technology transfers, we use a 
measure of trust from national, representative Eurobarometer surveys, as in Guiso (2009) and 
Bloom et al. (2012). In the surveys (details are in Section 3.2), citizens from different 
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countries are asked how much trust they have in people from various countries (a lot, some, 
not very much, no trust at all). This measure of trust is a measure of generalized trust and it 
reflects the perception of trustworthiness of the average citizen of a given country in a random 
citizen of another country (Guiso et al., 2009).  
How can we interpret such perceptions of generalized trust in light of our research 
question? Williamson (1993a) argues that “trust is warranted when the expected gain from 
placing oneself at risk to another is positive, but not otherwise. Indeed, the decision to accept 
such a risk is taken to imply trust”. Williamson (1993b) makes three conceptual distinctions 
of trust by dividing trust into calculative trust (considering potential risks), personal trust 
(from repeated interactions) and institutional trust (from the organizational context of the 
contracts). Arguably, people’s answers in the Eurobarometer survey reflect all three forms of 
trust. People might be calculative in the sense that they weigh up previous personal 
experiences with citizens from other countries. However, even if citizens do not have these 
experiences, they can have a perception of trustworthiness that might depend on, for example, 
perceived institutional quality and on cultural elements. Consistent with this argument, Guiso 
et al. (2009) find that cultural aspects, positive expectations of a country’s law enforcement, 
business morale, and the quality of the institutions form the beliefs upon which the 
generalized trust between citizens of countries from the Eurobarometer is based. Hence, for 
our purposes, we consider the measure of trust we deploy as a useful summary statistic for the 
perceived trustworthy environment of a country. Note that Williamson (1981) considers that 
trustworthiness can be regarded as the absence of opportunism which is key in transaction 
costs economics. Indeed, Williamson states that “contracting would nevertheless be feasible if 
economic agents were completely trustworthy” (page 1545). 
The Eurobarometer data reveal strong differences in perceived trust between nations. 
For example, Italians view Spaniards as more trustworthy than Dutch people do. Hence, it is 
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plausible to assume that managers of Italian and Dutch MNEs, who decide on how to 
organize their technology transfers, likely share perceptions of trustworthiness similar to their 
compatriots. Consistent with this assumption, we therefore expect that a Spanish subsidiary of 
an Italian MNE and a Spanish subsidiary of a Dutch MNE have a different governance of 
their foreign R&D inputs in a way that is consistent with national differences in perceived 
trustworthiness. The reason is that there is ample evidence that trust in the foreign country 
where the subsidiary is located increases the autonomy of the subsidiary with respect to the 
business group (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Bloom et al., 2012; Kastl et al., 2013; Cingano and 
Pinotti, 2016). This in turns can reduce technology transfers within the business group and 
induce more technology procurement via market channels. This argument is consistent with 
the theory of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985, 1993), which predicts that a 
reduction in mutual dependence favors market exchanges and reduces vertical integration.  
Note that an alternative possibility is that when a firm transfers sensitive technology to 
a foreign subsidiary, this knowledge is not completely excludable. It can be leaked or misused 
by the employees of the subsidiary. The trust environment in which a subsidiary is perceived 
to operate might reduce the concerns about the subsidiary’s ex post opportunistic behavior 
and thereby increase technology transfers within the business group. Moreover, if within-firm 
technology flows substitute knowledge from the market, higher perceived trustworthiness 
might reduce the imports of technologies that the subsidiary obtains from market channels. 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide an empirical assessment of the relative 
importance of these two possibilities.  
We use a unique panel dataset on European firms operating in Spain. It provides us 
with exhaustive information on firms’ R&D imports by provider. We combine these data with 
the Eurobarometer survey’s measure of trust between citizens of European countries. Our 
dataset includes information about 907 affiliates from European companies operating in Spain 
 5 
for the period 2005-2012. We have two measures of international technology transfers: R&D 
imports from companies that belong to the same business group (called from the group), and 
R&D imports from international providers located abroad that do not belong to the same 
business group (called from the market). These data provide, to our knowledge, the most 
detailed firm-level panel data information on R&D transactions by suppliers worldwide.  
European companies operating in Spain provide a good testing case for our research 
question. The reason is that Spain has been one of the main receivers of foreign direct 
investment from the European Union, and the risk of expropriation was very small in the 
period analyzed (OECD, 2015). In addition, countries which belong to the EU share a 
common institutional environment and intellectual property rights, which helps us to isolate 
the influence of trust on technology transfers. Moreover, our nationally representative 
measure of trust in Spaniards is exogenous to unobservable firm characteristics because trust 
is not measured in the headquarters of the subsidiary by asking the managers directly and it 
precedes the years of the firm technology transfers.1 
We deploy two identification strategies in this paper. The first strategy uses 
differences of trust that citizens from the countries of the parent companies have in Spaniards. 
In this way, we explore the cross-sectional variation of the data. The second identification 
strategy includes firm fixed effects in our regressions to analyze the effect of trust for 
subsidiaries that experience changes in the location of their parent company. This implies that 
we calculate results for within-firm variation of trust in Spaniards. Our findings are robust 
after including time-variant firm variables and extensive controls for heterogeneous country 
characteristics.  
Our results show that perceived trustworthiness in Spaniards significantly affects 
technology transfers. High levels of perceived trustworthiness in Spaniards raise international 
                                                 
1 In the Eurobarometer, the question on bilateral trust was not asked after 1997. 
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technology transfers from the market and reduce imports from the business group. We find in 
our cross-section estimations that increasing trustworthiness to the fourth quartile of the 
trustworthiness distribution reduces international technology transfers from the business 
group by 27.4%. The results from the estimations based on the within-firm trustworthiness 
variation are very similar for increases in trustworthiness beyond the average level of 
trustworthiness placed in Spaniards. This suggests that imports from the business group are 
important for low levels of trustworthiness and they decline once a high level of 
trustworthiness is reached.  
In cross-section estimations, we find that increasing trustworthiness in Spaniards 
raises imports from the international market for the entire distribution of trustworthiness in 
Spaniards, but this effect is concentrated in the fourth quartile of trustworthiness in our 
within-trustworthiness estimations. In these estimations, we find that increasing 
trustworthiness to the fourth quartile of the trustworthiness distribution increases technology 
transfers from the market by 22.9%. Overall, our findings suggest that trustworthiness is 
important for understanding the governance of technology transfers. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature and the 
theoretical considerations. Section 3 describes data sources, the construction of the main 
variables, and some empirical regularities. Section 4 shows the econometric specification and 
the description of the control variables. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Related literature and theoretical considerations  
One fundamental reason argued in the literature for the positive relationship between 
trust and economic growth is that agents with higher levels of trust are likely to invest and 
trade more than those with less trust (Fehr, 2009). Within organizations, higher levels of trust 
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have been associated with increasing workplace performance (Brown et al., 2015), innovation 
(Godart et al., 2017) and firm growth (Bloom et al., 2012). A mechanism behind these 
relationships is that principals who trust their agents more favor delegation and induce higher 
efforts from their agents. For example, Cingano and Pinotti (2016) present evidence from a 
sample of Italian firms that companies located in regions with higher levels of trust have 
larger value-added shares in delegation-intensive industries relative to other industries. Kastl 
et al. (2013) find that delegation increases R&D expenditures for a sample of Italian firms. 
Bloom et al. (2012) show for a sample of European MNEs that higher levels of bilateral trust 
between a multinational’s country of origin and a subsidiary’s country increases 
decentralization and firm size. An important difference in our approach with respect to this 
literature is that we focus on how the governance of technology imports depends on the host 
country’s perceived trustworthiness of the subsidiary. 
In synthesis, these findings suggest that higher levels of perceived trust increase 
delegation for the provision of technology to the subsidiary. According to transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1985, 1993a), one consequence of a reduction of the dependence of 
the subsidiary on the group is a reduction of trade of technology within the firm and an 
increase in procurement from the market. The reason is that vertical integration is more likely 
when mutual dependence between sellers and buyers is high, and high trust reduces such 
dependency. Therefore, trust might shape the decision of foreign subsidiaries to source their 
R&D imports from the international market or from within the business group. By providing 
evidence for this channel, our paper contributes to a better understanding of how knowledge 
is obtained and organized through foreign direct investment.  
An alternative argument that might compete with the previous explanations is that trust 
can reduce concerns about the subsidiary’s ex post opportunistic behavior This logic might be 
particularly important in the case of technology because knowledge can be leaked. For 
 8 
example, Lai et al (2009) argue that R&D is not outsourced as much as manufacturing goods 
because outsourcing R&D might lead to the potential leakage of trade secrets. Moreover, 
market failures might be likely to arise in high R&D intensive goods. In this line, Siddharthan 
and Kurma (1991) find for US multinationals that internalization is high in R&D and skill 
intensive industries given to the product novelty and buyer’s uncertainty. 
Our paper also advances the literature on the determinants of intra-firm trade by 
showing that trust is key to discerning the source of foreign flows of technology within firms. 
The literature has predominantly focused on the role of contractual incompleteness and the 
hold-up problem for the choice between outsourcing and vertical integration.2 The theoretical 
arguments of Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2008) are based on the property rights 
theory of Grossman and Hart (1986). Their emphasis is on the role of asset ownership that 
allows allocating residual rights of control in case there are contingencies in the trade 
relationship. From an empirical perspective, Ulset (1996) analyzes determinants of internal 
and external R&D projects and their relationship with contractual incompleteness. Nunn and 
Trefler (2013) argue that intra-firm trade is positively related to non-contractible headquarter 
inputs while Bernard et al. (2010) show that it is negatively related to product contractibility 
and country governance quality. 3  Moreover, Bernard et al. (2010) consider that country 
governance might mitigate the effect of product contractibility and thus reduce intra-firm 
trade. In contrast to this literature, we study how, for a given level of product contractibility, 
trustworthiness in the host country induces intra-firm and market trade of technology.  
Previous literature on intra-firm trade (Helleiner and Lavergne, 1979; Siddharthan and 
Kumar, 1990) suggests that transaction costs and market failures are expected to increase 
within-firm trade and decrease open market transactions. Intra-firm trade is substituted over 
time by arm-length transactions when the market grows, and transaction costs decrease. In 
                                                 
2 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a review of the literature. 
3 Country governance quality is a variable constructed from the World Bank governance indicators.  
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contrast to our paper, these articles do not analyze the role of trustworthiness on intra-firm 
and market trade. 
Finally, our paper also sheds new light on technology transfers within MNEs. Several 
articles consider transfers of intangibles and technology within MNEs essential to 
understanding the existence of MNEs (Teece, 1977; Markusen, 1984; Teece, 1986; Atalay et 
al., 2014; Ramondo et al., 2016). Branstetter et al. (2006) find that technology transfer 
payments within MNEs increase after intellectual property right reforms. One possible reason 
is that the likelihood of knowledge leakages decreases after a strengthening of intellectual 
property rights. The novelty of our paper is that we provide evidence of one type of 
technology transfer within MNEs, namely, R&D imports. Moreover, we show that R&D 
imports within the group are quantitatively larger than technology obtained from the market. 
In addition, our results suggest that transfers within MNEs are key in low-trust environments.  
 
3. Data, main variables and some empirical regularities 
The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of perceived trustworthiness in the host 
country on technology transfers within the business group and from the market for 
subsidiaries from foreign MNEs. Our source of firm-level data comes from a survey of firms 
operating in Spain (Panel de Innovación Tecnológica, PITEC). It is a panel database 
constructed by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics on the basis of annual responses to 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) administered to a representative sample of Spanish 
firms.4 In the survey, each company provides information on some of its economic data, such 
as sales or number of employees, its ownership structure, the location of its parent company 
                                                 
4The PITEC survey is specifically designed to analyze R&D and other innovating activities following the 
recommendations of the OSLO Manual on performing innovation surveys (see OECD 2005). Details on PITEC 
and data access guidelines can be obtained at http://icono.fecyt.es/PITEC/Paginas/descarga_bbdd.aspx.  
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and, most importantly for our research question, very detailed information on firms’ imports 
of technology distinguished by provider.5  
We conduct the empirical analysis for the years 2005 to 2012. We also use country-level 
data from different sources, which we explain below, to control for characteristics of the 
parent company’s country. Based on the availability of data on our trust measure, we use a 
panel of 907 firms that are subsidiaries of foreign European MNEs operating in Spain during 
the sample period.6 The panel contains an average of seven observations per firm, with the 
parent companies of these subsidiaries located mostly in France (27.6%), Germany (24.5%), 
the Netherlands (10.7%), the UK (10%), and Italy (7.7%), as shown in the first column of 
Table 1.  
 
3.1. International technology transfers from inside and outside the business group 
Our main interest is to analyze to what extent trustworthiness influences international 
technology transfers within the business group and from the market. Our measures of 
international technology transfers are R&D services acquired abroad by the subsidiary within 
the business group and from the market. In the survey, each company indicates its R&D 
acquisitions, that is, its purchases of R&D services.7 R&D acquisitions are defined in the 
survey as:  
“Acquisitions of R&D services outside the firm through contracts, informal 
agreements, etc… Funds to finance other companies, research associations, etc… that do not 
directly imply purchases of R&D services are excluded”.   
                                                 
5 The questions we quote below are from the English version of the CIS questionnaire. These questions are the 
exact equivalent of those in the Spanish questionnaire. 
6 In the Eurobarometer, there is information on trust in Spaniards from citizens from 17 European countries. In 
our firm-level sample, there are 907 firms from these countries. 
7 R&D services are defined in the survey as: “Creative work to increase the volume of knowledge and to create 
new or improved products and processes (including the development of software)”. 
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The data allow for the disaggregation of R&D acquisitions into domestic purchases (in 
Spain) or imports (from abroad). With this information, we construct the variables R&D 
imports within the group and R&D imports from the market. Both variables are the logarithm 
of imports of R&D from companies that belong to the same business group and R&D imports 
from providers that do not belong to the same business group, respectively, after dividing by 
the number of employees. Measures similar to our measure of international technology 
transfers within the group are used by Hu et al. (2005) and Branstetter et al. (2006), who take 
the expenditures on disembodied technology purchased from foreign providers as a measure 
of foreign technology transfers. In contrast to previous research, we can account for the exact 
amount of technology imports of a given firm within and outside the business group, and 
thereby compare technology transfers within a vertical integration relationship or through 
market channels at the firm level.  
 
3.2. Trust in the host country 
Our main independent variable is trust in Spaniards by citizens from the country where 
the parent company is located. Trust data are constructed with data from several waves of the 
Eurobarometer survey, as in Guiso et al. (2009) and Bloom et al. (2012).8 In the Appendix of 
this paper, we include full details on all country data sources. In the survey, citizens from 
different countries (mostly from the European Economic Area) are asked:  
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from 
various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not 
very much trust or no trust at all”.  
                                                 
8 The Eurobarometer is available at http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm.  We collect 
information from the following waves of the Eurobarometer where this question is asked: 1986, 1990, 1993, 
1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. For Eastern European countries, we collect information from the Central and 
Eastern European Barometer for the year 1990. Our measure is calculated as the average trust for these years. 
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A number that varies from 1 = “no trust at all” to 4 = “a lot of trust” is assigned to each 
answer. Our measure of trust in Spaniards is computed as the average trust that citizens of the 
MNE’s headquarter country of a subsidiary have in Spaniards. We remove country fixed 
effects by dividing this average by the mean trust of each country. The main advantage of the 
trust variable as elicited in the Eurobarometer is that it reflects the perception of the average 
citizen of a given country. Therefore, it also likely reflects the thoughts and attitudes of 
managers and middlemen of a firm (Guiso et al., 2009). Moreover, since the Eurobarometer 
survey is not directly conducted in the headquarters of the subsidiaries that we have in our 
sample and it precedes the years of the firm technology transfers, our measure of trust is 
exogenous to unobservable firm characteristics. Put differently, if managers of firms in our 
sample had been asked about how much trust they have in their subsidiaries, omitted variables 
would be correlated to this measure of trust and technology transfers. For example, if 
technology transfers had been very profitable for the firm, managers would likely believe 
more in the trustworthiness of the subsidiary and this would overstate the causal link between 
trust and technology transfers. On the flipside, if technology transfers had been unprofitable, 
the causal link between trust and technology transfers would be understated.  
The key features of our measure of trust are that there is variation across countries in the 
sample, as shown in the second column of Table 1, and there are some changes in the 
headquarter location. Most countries trust Spaniards more than they trust other countries, on 
average. This is particularly relevant for Greek, Austrian and Italian citizens. Citizens from 
these countries trust Spanish citizens from 15.1% to 21.5% more than they trust citizens from 
other countries in the sample. In contrast, citizens from Norway, Slovakia and the United 
Kingdom trust Spain from 10.2% to 15% less than they trust people from other countries, on 
average.  
TABLE 1 
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3.3. Empirical regularities: Trust in Spaniards and international technology transfers 
Figure 1 provides a sense of the relationship between trust and international technology 
transfers within the group and through market channels. We divide R&D imports into four 
trust quartiles. On average, imports within the group are around two and a half to three times 
larger than imports from the international market. The distribution of imports within the group 
across quartiles suggests that as trust increases from the first to the third quartile, imports 
within the group increase. However, further increases in trust dramatically decrease R&D 
imports within the group. By contrast, imports from the international market increase as trust 
increases, except from the second to the third quartile, where there is a small decline. These 
features suggest that there is an inverted-U relationship between trustworthiness and imports 
within the group, and a positive relationship between trustworthiness and imports from the 
international market. We now turn to use econometric techniques to analyze whether these 
relationships are robust after controlling for covariates. 
FIGURE 1 
 
4. Econometric specification and control variables 
 Our main goal is to estimate the effect of trustworthiness in the subsidiary on 
technology transfers within the business group and through market channels. Our baseline 
specifications are as follows: 
𝑅𝑅&𝐷𝐷 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 ++𝛽𝛽4Z𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,     (1) 
where the sub-indices refer to company i from country j (where the parent company is 
located) in year t. The variable 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  denotes trustworthiness in Spaniards from citizens 
from the country where the parent company is located; X𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 are a set of firm characteristics; 
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Z𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 are variables that control for the features of the country where the parent company is 
located and economic and cultural similarities with respect to Spain, which we explain in 
detail below; 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 are year fixed effects, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term. The coefficient of interest is 
𝛽𝛽2, which captures the effect of trustworthiness on a subsidiary’s R&D imports.  
 We include the following firm characteristics as control variables: labor productivity, 
the average wage in the R&D department and an indicator that takes the value 1 if the 
company has applied for patents to control for absorptive capacity and skill mix, and 0 
otherwise. We also include market power to control for competition and capital per employee 
to control for physical investments. Moreover, we include two variables to measure the 
degree of innovative or adopted R&D within the subsidiary given that innovative R&D and 
outsourcing of technology might be complementary (Odagiri, 1983). The first variable that we 
add is innovative R&D intensity, which accounts for the percentage of sales of products new 
to the market. The second variable is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the firms have not 
undertaken any product or process innovation, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we add export status 
and the degree of internationalization of the sector where the subsidiary operates because 
trade can induce companies to engage in other globalization strategies (e.g., Tomiura, 2007). 
The sectoral openness is calculated as sectoral imports plus exports over sectoral production 
(these sectoral data come from the OECD). 
 We add the following variables as country controls: Companies that come from high-
tech countries can have access to a wider technological network and profit from updated 
technologies, which can enhance technology transfers. Following these arguments, first, we 
include the variable R&D expenditures as percent of GDP in our specification. The data come 
from the World Bank. Second, we include the logarithm of the GDP per capita (data from the 
IMF). Firms’ R&D imports might also depend on tax differentials (Devereux and Griffith, 
1998). For this reason, we include a measure of corporate taxes as the ratio of corporate 
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income taxes of a given country over corporate income taxes of Spain. The data come from 
the tax database of the OECD. If corporate taxes are higher in Spain than in the partner 
country, MNEs might increase imports within the group to reduce taxable profits in the high-
tax country. Therefore, we might expect a positive relationship between relative corporate 
taxes and R&D imports within the group.9 Moreover, we control for R&D policy incentives 
(R&D taxes and other R&D related subsidies). This variable is constructed as the percentage 
of business and enterprise R&D financed by the government of a given country minus the 
percentage of business and enterprise R&D financed by the government of Spain. These data 
come from the OECD. Finally, we add the physical distance between capitals. Keller and 
Yeaple (2013) argue that complex technologies become costly to transfer as transport costs 
increase, which would decrease both types of technological transactions. We use the distance 
between capitals as a proxy for transport costs.10 In the Appendix of the paper, we document 
detailed variable definitions, data sources, and summary statistics (Table A1). Table OA1 in 
the On-line Appendix documents the correlation between the variables.  It turns out that most 
variables are only weakly correlated. 
 We employ two identification strategies. The first strategy uses the differences of trust 
that the citizens from the countries of the parent companies have in Spaniards. In this way, we 
explore the cross-sectional variation of the data. The second identification strategy includes 
firm fixed effects in our regressions. In this way, we can analyze the effect of trust when there 
are changes in the location of the parent company. There are 161 foreign subsidiaries whose 
headquarters changed their location during the sample period. Hence, our trust coefficient is 
identified from within-firm variation of trust while controlling for all time-invariant firm 
characteristics that might affect R&D imports.  
 
                                                 
 
10 This is the shortest distance between the two capitals on the surface of the Earth, which is measured as a 
sphere. This variable is in logarithms. The data come from CEPII. 
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5. The effect of trust on technology transfers:  
5.1. Our main result: Distinguishing between the main international channels 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between trustworthiness and international 
technology transfers, distinguishing between within the firm or through international market 
channels. We present results in Table 2. In panel A, the dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of R&D imports from the business group and in panel B, the dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of imports from the market. 
In columns 1, 3, 5 and 7, we show results for our measure of trustworthiness in 
Spaniards. In columns 2, 4, 6 and 8, we include indicator variables for each quartile of 
trustworthiness in Spaniards, to account for non-linear effects. We report estimates from four 
specifications: (i) in columns 1 and 2, we do not include any firm or country controls; (ii) in 
columns 3 and 4, we include country controls; (iii) in columns 5 and 6, we add firm controls; 
and (iv) in columns 7 and 8, we include firm fixed effects to measure the effect of 
trustworthiness for firms whose parent company changes its location over the sample period. 
In all regressions in both panels, we include industry and year fixed effects. All standard 
errors are clustered at the country level. 
In column 1a, we observe that trust is negatively related to R&D imports from the 
business group although this effect is not precisely estimated. Once we distinguish between 
trust quartiles, we find a negative and highly significant effect of trust in Spaniards on imports 
from the business group for MNEs at the highest level of trust in Spaniards. This relationship 
is robust after the inclusion of country or firm controls. The magnitude of the effect is large: 
in the most conservative estimations in column 6a, MNEs within the fourth quartile of trust 
decrease technology transfers from the market by 27.4% as compared with MNEs in the first 
quartile of trust in Spaniards. This implies that subsidiaries from countries with the highest 
trust in Spaniards have fewer technology transfers within the firm than subsidiaries from other 
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countries. In columns 7a and 8a, we include firm fixed effects to measure how within-firm 
trust variation affects R&D imports. The coefficients from columns 7a are negative and 
statistically significantly different from zero. Focusing on the quartile measures of trust, in 
columns 8a, we note that the negative effect is concentrated in MNEs from countries with 
above average trust in Spaniards (3rd and 4th trust quartile).  
TABLE 2 
 
With respect to the relationship between trustworthiness in Spaniards and R&D imports 
from the market in panel B, we show in columns 1b to 6b that trust is always strongly 
positively related to R&D imports from the international market. For example, the coefficient 
of trust in column 5b indicates that an increase in trust by one unit increases imports from the 
international market by 88.3%. Once we include firm fixed effects in columns 7a and 8a, we 
find that the positive relationship is only significant for the highest quartile of trust.  
With respect to the country controls, the estimated coefficient of the GDP per capita 
variable is negative and significant in panel A and positive and significant in panel B. R&D 
expenditures as percent of GDP is negative and significantly related to imports from the 
international market in panel B. The effect is the opposite in the case of tax similarities, which 
is positive and significant at conventional levels in panel B. Among the firm-level controls, 
patents, average physical investment and being an exporter are significant and positively 
related to R&D imports from the group. Average salary in R&D, patents, innovative R&D 
intensity, labor productivity and average physical investment are significant and positively 
related to imports from the international market.11 
                                                 
11 Although our results appear to be weak in terms of R2, F-tests reject in all cases the null hypothesis that all 
independent variables in the model are not jointly significant in affecting the dependent variable. 
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Overall, the results in panels A and B show a pattern of opposite-signed effects of trust 
on technology transfers from the group and from the market, which suggests that as trust 
increases, there is a reduction in the knowledge flows within the firm and an increase in the 
technology imported from external providers.  
In Table 3, we present results from alternative econometric specifications. In order to 
account for observations with zero R&D imports, we present estimates using a random effect 
Tobit model in columns 1 and 2 and a fixed effect Poisson model in columns 3 and 4. In all 
specifications, we include industry and year fixed effects and country and firm controls in all 
regressions. The key messages remain unchanged. 
TABLE 3 
 
Moreover, to account for potential omitted variables that might have overstated the 
estimated trust coefficients, in Table OA2 in the On-line Appendix, we include additional 
country controls and, in Table OA3 in the On-line Appendix, we drop countries considered 
tax havens according to Spanish jurisdiction.12 We include three institutional indicators that 
capture different dimensions of rule violations and law enforcement in the country of the 
parent company (the source of these variables is the World Bank): the rule of law; 
government accountability and control of corruption. We add these indicators because the 
trust in Spaniards variable might be reflecting perceived differences in rule violations (Bloom 
et al., 2012).  
In all regressions, the results are consistent with our previous estimations in Table 2 
and support the positive relationship between trustworthiness and R&D imports from the 
                                                 
12  This information is provided by the European Union at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/tax-good-governance/tax-good-governance-world-
seen-eu-countries_en. We drop observations from Ireland, whose average corporate taxes for the sample period  
were 12.5%, and Luxembourg because of the special low taxes on dividends and capital gains.  
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international market and the negative effect of trustworthiness on imports from the business 
group. This suggests that our results are not biased by omitted variables related to country 
institutional differences or tax havens.13 
 
5.2. The joint decision of importing from the business group and from the market 
 To shed light on potential differences for firms that simultaneously import R&D from 
the business group and from the market, in Table 4 we consider the percentage of R&D 
imports from the business group over total R&D imports as the dependent variable. Our 
estimations are for the sample of firms with positive total R&D imports. In the following 
tables, we follow the same specification as in Table 2. 
TABLE 4 
 
 Our results in Table 4 show that the coefficient of trust is negative and statistically 
significant in columns 1 and 5. However, in the specifications in columns 3 and 7, trust is not 
significantly different from zero. Once we differentiate across trust quartiles, we observe a 
strong negative relationship for the second and fourth quartile of trust, which suggests that as 
trust increases, there is a decrease in the percentage of imports from the group, but this effect 
is not linear. This result remains once we include country and firm controls in columns 4 and 
6. In columns 7 and 8, once we add firm fixed effects, the coefficient of trust remains negative 
and statistically significant for the second quartile of trust. These results support the 
conclusion of a negative effect of trust on the percentage of imports from the business group 
and the consequently positive effect for imports from the international market.  
 
5.3. Distinguishing between international market channels 
                                                 
13 Note that, once we exclude countries considered as tax havens, corporate taxes are relatively similar across 
countries in our sample for the analyzed period. 
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 In order to gain further insights on the effects of trust on R&D transactions through the 
international market, we explore the heterogeneous effect of trust on different stratifications 
of international market channels. In Table OA4 in the On-line Appendix, we report the 
classification and definitions of the different subcategories of R&D imports. In Table 5, we 
present estimates based on three different international market channels. Panel A reports 
evidence for foreign private firms. Panel B reports results for foreign universities and Panel C 
presents evidence for other foreign sources not previously included.14  
TABLE 5 
 
 In all cases the results confirm a positive relationship between trust and imports of 
R&D from the different foreign channels. In Panel A, the estimated coefficients in the 
different specifications are quite similar to those in Table 2 for total R&D imports from the 
foreign market. This suggests that trust is key in obtaining new knowledge from other foreign 
private companies that are not part of the business group. In Panels B and C, estimated 
coefficients are significantly lower than in Panel A. This implies that trust in the subsidiary is 
less important when the subsidiary is acquiring R&D services from foreign universities or 
other foreign sources than when they acquiring them from other foreign private firms. One 
possible reason is that private firms generate more commercial research than universities. For 
example, Spencer (2001) finds that corporate research is more influential than university 
research for Japanese firms’ commercial applications. Therefore, a higher level of delegation 
might be needed for the subsidiary to coordinate with foreign private firms than with foreign 
universities.  
 
7. Summary and concluding remarks  
                                                 
14 For the average firm, R&D imports from foreign private firms account for most R&D imports from the foreign 
market (98.1% on average). Other foreign sources include foreign public administrations, foreign non-profitable 
organizations and non-specified foreign sources.  
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 In this paper, we studied the effects of trust on technology transfers. This is important 
for understanding how knowledge is organized within MNEs. We estimated determinants of 
R&D imports within the group and through market channels for affiliates from European 
firms operating in Spain. We find evidence that trustworthiness in Spaniards is negatively 
related to technology transfers within the business group and positively related to acquisitions 
through market channels. These results are consistent with transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985, 1993) on the importance of vertical transactions in low-trust 
environments, and on the role of trust to enhance decentralization and delegation to the 
affiliate. Our findings suggest that an increase in trustworthiness may significantly change the 
channels through which knowledge flows, and as a consequence, influence innovation and 
reduce technological dependence on the foreign MNE.   
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FIGURE AND TABLES  
Figure 1: Trust in Spaniards and R&D imports by trust quartiles 
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Table 1: Distribution of subsidiaries by country of origin and trust in Spaniards. 
Country Observations Trust 
Austria 56 1.172 
Belgium 186 1.055 
Czech Republic 1 0.913 
Denmark 112 0.987 
Finland 77 1.062 
France 1,598 1.094 
Germany 1,418 0.966 
Greece 1 1.215 
Ireland 46 1.028 
Italy 447 1.151 
Luxembourg 229 1.150 
Netherlands 619 1.012 
Norway 69 0.850 
Portugal 142 1.112 
Slovakia 1 0.894 
Sweden 202 1.084 
UK 578 0.898 
Total 5782 
 Notes: The data include observations from all PITEC dataset firms that are subsidiaries of foreign MNEs during the 
period 2005-2012. Trust is the average trust that citizens of the MNE’s headquarter country of a subsidiary have in 
Spaniards, dividing by the mean trust of each country.  
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Table 2: Trust and R&D imports distinguishing between imports from the business group and the market 
Panel A: Dependent variable R&D imports from business group   
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
Trust -0.552  -0.375  -0.326  -1.333**  
 (0.494)  (0.453)  (0.420)  (0.582)  
2nd quartile of trust  -0.071  -0.090  -0.061  -0.096 
  (0.109)  (0.110)  (0.128)  (0.111) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.075  0.094  0.132  -0.403* 
  (0.055)  (0.072)  (0.091)  (0.199) 
4th quartile of trust  -0.314***  -0.330***  -0.274**  -0.194* 
  (0.057)  (0.105)  (0.099)  (0.094) 
Observations 5,782 5,782 4,814 4,814 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 
R-squared 0.075 0.078 0.078 0.080 0.084 0.085 0.012 0.013 
Panel B: Dependent variable R&D imports from the international market 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) 
Trust 1.009***  0.771***  0.883***  0.463  
 (0.276)  (0.214)  (0.140)  (0.563)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.271***  0.275***  0.255**  0.200 
  (0.075)  (0.082)  (0.091)  (0.122) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.125***  0.088***  0.120**  -0.077 
  (0.022)  (0.027)  (0.046)  (0.119) 
4th quartile of trust  0.291***  0.246***  0.229***  0.216* 
  (0.036)  (0.046)  (0.051)  (0.118) 
Observations 5,782 5,782 4,814 4,814 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 
R-squared 0.046 0.050 0.088 0.091 0.106 0.107 0.015 0.016 
Country controls   yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls     yes yes yes yes 
Firm FEs       yes yes 
Industry FEs and year FEs in all regressions 
Notes: The dependent variable in panel A is R&D imports from the business group. The dependent variable in panel B is R&D imports from the international market. 
Country controls are GDP per capita, geographical distance, R&D as percentage of GDP, R&D policy incentives and corporate taxes. Firm controls are average salary in 
R&D, patents, labor productivity, market power, exporter, innovative R&D intensity, innovative indicator, average physical investment and industry internationalization. For 
exact definitions and sources of all variables, see the Appendix. Estimated standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. All estimations are OLS. * p < 
10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%.  
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Table 3: Robustness checks. Tobit and Poisson models 
Panel A: Dependent variable R&D imports from business group 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
Estimation method: Tobit Tobit Poisson Poisson 
Trust -1.183  -4.214***  
 (0.987)  (1.115)  
2nd quartile of trust  -0.195  -0.422* 
  (0.227)  (0.247) 
3rd quartile of trust  -0.050  -1.430*** 
  (0.193)  (0.356) 
4th quartile of trust  -0.435*  -0.578** 
  (0.250)  (0.243) 
Observations 4,804 4,813 908 908 
Panel B: Dependent variable R&D imports from the international market 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
Estimation method: Tobit Tobit Poisson Poisson 
Trust 1.179  1.478  
 (1.098)  (1.475)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.485*  0.767* 
  (0.257)  (0.396) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.164  -0.122 
  (0.171)  (0.407) 
4th quartile of trust  0.484*  1.098** 
  (0.281)  (0.458) 
Observations 4,804 4,813 581 581 
Industry FEs, year FEs, country and firm controls in all regressions  
Firm FEs   Yes Yes 
Notes: All independent variables are lagged one period. Country controls are GDP per capita, geographical 
distance, R&D as percentage of GDP, R&D policy incentives and corporate taxes. Firm controls are average 
salary in R&D, patents, labor productivity, market power, exporter, innovative R&D intensity, innovative 
indicator, average physical investment and industry internationalization. For exact definitions and sources of all 
variables, see the Appendix. Estimated standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. All 
estimations are OLS. * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%. 
 29 
Table 4: Exploring the effect of trust on the ratio of R&D imports from the group over total R&D imports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Trust -0.747*  -0.302  -0.658**  0.363  
 (0.373)  (0.317)  (0.259)  (0.589)  
2nd quartile of trust  -0.172***  -0.195***  -0.245***  -0.227*** 
  (0.046)  (0.037)  (0.045)  (0.077) 
3rd quartile of trust  -0.023  0.000  -0.053  -0.156 
  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.043)  (0.092) 
4th quartile of trust  -0.289***  -0.252***  -0.299***  -0.079 
  (0.036)  (0.053)  (0.052)  (0.067) 
         
Observations 682 682 570 570 567 567 567 567 
R-squared 0.212 0.248 0.330 0.351 0.381 0.397 0.121 0.128 
Country controls   yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls     yes yes yes yes 
Firm FEs       yes yes 
Industry FEs and year FEs in all regressions 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio between imports of R&D from the group over total R&D imports. All independent variables are lagged one period. Country 
controls are GDP per capita, geographical distance, R&D as percentage of GDP, R&D policy incentives and corporate taxes. Firm controls are average salary in R&D, 
patents, labor productivity, market power, exporter, innovative R&D intensity, innovative indicator, average physical investment and industry internationalization. For exact 
definitions and sources of all variables, see the Appendix. Estimated standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. All estimations are OLS.  
* p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%. 
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Table 5: Trust and R&D imports from international market distinguishing between import channels 
Panel A: Dependent variable R&D imports from foreign private firms   
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
Trust 0.894***  0.668***  0.759***  0.493  
 (0.224)  (0.188)  (0.132)  (0.566)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.246***  0.243***  0.224**  0.120 
  (0.075)  (0.076)  (0.083)  (0.099) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.115***  0.083***  0.109**  -0.107 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.040)  (0.122) 
4th quartile of trust  0.253***  0.200***  0.186***  0.198 
  (0.031)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.118) 
Panel B: Dependent variable R&D imports from foreign universities 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) 
Trust 0.158***  0.139***  0.145***  0.077  
 (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.045)  (0.246)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.039***  0.051**  0.056*  0.117* 
  (0.009)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.063) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.026***  0.019***  0.010  -0.017 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.019)  (0.042) 
4th quartile of trust  0.037***  0.044**  0.054*  0.096* 
  (0.009)  (0.015)  (0.027)  (0.055) 
Panel C: Dependent variable R&D imports from other foreign sources 
  (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) (5c) (6c) (7c) (8c) 
Trust 0.094  0.083  0.103**  -0.058  
 (0.075)  (0.056)  (0.040)  (0.056)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.034*  0.037*  0.033  0.020*** 
  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.006) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.007  0.004  0.013  -0.027 
  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.033) 
4th quartile of trust  0.040***  0.040***  0.033**  0.008 
  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.007) 
Country controls   yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls     yes yes yes yes 
Firm FEs       yes yes 
Industry FEs and year FEs in all regressions 
Notes: For exact definitions and sources of all variables, see the Appendix. Estimated standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. All estimations are OLS. * p < 10%, ** p 
< 5%, *** p < 1%. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In this appendix, we define country variables, describe data sources that we use in our 
analysis and present the descriptive statistics. 
 
Definition of the variables 
 
Trust: Our main independent variable is trust in Spaniards. It is the average trust that citizens 
of the MNE’s headquarter country of a subsidiary have in Spaniards, dividing by the mean 
trust of each country. The Eurobarometer survey provides information about this question. In 
the survey, citizens from different countries (mostly from the European Economic Area) are 
asked: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from 
various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not 
very much trust or no trust at all”. A number is assigned for each answer. We collect 
information from the following waves of the Eurobarometer where this question is asked: 
1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. For Eastern European countries, we collect 
information from the Central and Eastern European Barometer for the year 1990. 
 
GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of the GDP over the population of the MNE’s 
headquarter country. The data are from the IMF (from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx). The variable “GDP 
per capita” ranges from 9.69 to 11.63 in our sample. 
 
Geographical distance is the distance between the capital of the MNE’s headquarter country 
and Madrid. The measure is in logarithms. The data are from CEPII 
(http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6). For details on this 
database, see Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2011), Notes on CEPII’s distances measures: the 
GeoDist Database. CEPII Working Paper 2011-25. 
 
R&D as % of GDP is the research and development expenditure as a percentage of the GDP 
of the MNE’s headquarter country. The source of these data is the World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?view=chart). The variable 
“R&D as % of GDP” is in logarithms and it ranges from -0.74 to 1.32. 
 
Corporate taxes are the corporate income taxes of the MNE’s headquarter country over 
Spanish corporate taxes. The data come from the OECD database 
(http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=58204#), completed with data from KPMG Global 
corporate tax rate tables (https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/services/tax/tax-tools-and-
resources/tax-rates-online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html). The variable ranges from 0.35 to 
1.20.  
 
R&D policy incentives is a variable that measures the difference between the percentage of 
business and enterprise R&D that is financed by the government in the MNE’s headquarter 
country and the  percentage of business and enterprise R&D that is financed by the Spanish 
government. It includes R&D tax credits and other subsidies related to business R&D. The 
data come from the OECD (Main Science and Technology Indicators: 
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=MSTI_PUB&ShowO
nWeb=true&Lang=en). The variable ranges from -16.32 to -.049. 
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The following variables refer to characteristics of the MNE’s headquarter country used in the 
robustness checks of the On-line Appendix. For the following three variables, the data come 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports 
 
Rule of law reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement and property rights. The index 
can take values between -2.5 and 2.5. In our sample, it ranges from 0.35 to 1.99. 
 
Accountability reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. The index can take values between -2.5 and 2.5. In our sample, 
it ranges from 0.80 to 1.76. 
 
Control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests.  The index can take values between -2.5 and 2.5. In 
our sample, it ranges from -0.18 to 2.5. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean SD Observations 
  R&D imports from the group 0.538 1.933 8668 
  R&D imports from the market 0.267 1.305 8668 
     from foreign private firms   0.248 1.261 8668 
     from foreign universities  0.027 0.386 8668 
     from other foreign sources  0.019 0.322 8668 
Trust 
 
1.035 0.081 5782 
Country controls  
   GDP per capita 
 
10.674 0.311 8000 
   Geographical distance 
 
7.552 0.719 8016 
   R&D as % of GDP 
 
0.760 0.351 7716 
   Corporate taxes 
 
1.032 0.184 8022 
   R&D policy incentives -8.857 3.726 7023 
Firm controls 
   Average salary in R&D 
 
5.033 5.177 8669 
   Patents 0.101 0.301 8669 
   Labor productivity 
 
12.316 1.016 8668 
   Market power 
 
1.000 2.374 8669 
   Exporter 
 
0.723 0.447 8668 
   Average physical investment 6.508 3.664 8668 
   Innovative R&D intensity 8.082 19.919 7689 
   Innovative indicator 0.364 0.481 8638 
   Industry internationalization 0.134 0.116 9872 
Institutional country indicators 
 
   
   Rule of law 
 
1.520 0.380 8038 
   Accountability 
 
1.294 0.269 8038 
   Control of corruption 
 
1.551 0.498 8034 
Notes: The data include observations from all PITEC dataset firms that are subsidiaries of foreign MNEs during the 
period 2005-2012. R&D imports from the business group (market) is the natural logarithm of R&D imports from the 
business group (market); the R&D imports from the international market can be disaggregated into those from foreign 
private companies, from foreign universities and from other foreign sources. Trust is the trust that citizens of the 
MNE’s headquarter country have in Spaniards. GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of the GDP over the 
population of the MNE’s headquarter country. Geographical distance is the distance between the capital of the MNE’s 
headquarter country and Madrid (in natural logarithm). R&D as % of GDP is the research and development 
expenditure as percentage of the GDP of the MNE’s headquarter country. R&D policy incentives are the public 
incentives to business and enterprise R&D of a given country minus those of Spain. Corporate taxes are the corporate 
income taxes of the MNE’s headquarter country over Spanish corporate taxes. Average salary in R&D is the total 
salary in R&D over the number of employees working in R&D of a firm. Patents is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if the firm has applied for patents in the current or previous two years. Labor productivity is the natural 
logarithm of the sales over the number of employees of a firm. Market power is a firm’s sales relative to its industry. 
Exporter is an indicator that takes the value one if the firm is an exporter. Average physical investment is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s average physical investment over its number of employees. Innovative R&D intensity is the 
percentage over sales of new products new to the market. Innovative indicator is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one if the firm does not have any product or process innovation. Industry internationalization is the degree of openness 
(imports plus exports over production) of the sector where the firm operates. The following variables refer to 
characteristics of the MNE’s headquarter country used in the robustness checks of the On-line Appendix: Rule of law 
reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in the rules of society, and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement and property rights; Accountability reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government; Control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to 
which public power is exercised for private gain. For sources of all country variables, see the main text or the 
Appendix of the paper. 
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Table OA1: Correlation matrix 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] 
[1] Total R&D imports 1.00                  
[2] R&D imports from the group 0.89 1.00                 
[3] R&D imports from the market 0.52 0.14                 
[4] Trust  0.05 0.05 0.02 1.00               
[5] GDP per capita 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 1.00              
[6] Geographical distance 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.63 1.00             
[7] R&D as % of GDP 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.48 0.32 0.43 1.00            
[8] Corporate taxes 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.26 -0.19 -0.35 0.13 1.00           
[9] R&D policy incentives -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.13 -0.36 -0.14 0.31 1.00          
[10] Average salary in R&D 0.17 0.11 0.41 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.07 1.00         
[11] Patents 0.13 0.04 0.21 0.05 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.30 1.00        
[12] Labor productivity 0.05 0.04 0.14 -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.03 1.00       
[13] Market power 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.30 1.00      
[14] Exporter 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.03 -0.07 0.25 0.13 0.10 -0.03 1.00     
[15] Average physical investment 0.12 0.09 0.15 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.24 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.20 1.00    
[16] Innovative R&D intensity 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04 1.00   
[17] Innovative indicator -0.14 -0.11 -0.23 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.42 -0.17 -0.10 -0.04 -0.22 -0.18 -0.25 1.00  
[18] Industry internationalization 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.18 0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.15 1.00 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficients. See the Appendix of the paper for a full description of the variables. 
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Table OA2: Robustness checks adding institutional indicators 
Panel A: Dependent variable imports of R&D from business group 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
Trust -1.335**  -1.355**  -1.354**  
 
(0.579)  (0.582)  (0.578)  
2nd quartile of trust  -0.096  -0.094  -0.098 
 
 (0.111)  (0.108)  (0.111) 
3rd quartile of trust  -0.405*  -0.402*  -0.410* 
 
 (0.199)  (0.195)  (0.200) 
4th quartile of trust  -0.193*  -0.199**  -0.197** 
 
 (0.093)  (0.094)  (0.092) 
Rule of law -0.080 -0.084     
 (0.174) (0.169)     
Accountability   -0.481 -0.471   
   (0.328) (0.320)   
Control of corruption     -0.090 -0.095 
     (0.130) (0.128) 
Observations 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 
Panel B: Dependent variable imports of R&D from the international market 
 
(1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
Trust 0.458  0.470  0.426  
 
(0.542)  (0.566)  (0.523)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.198  0.199  0.196 
 
 (0.123)  (0.121)  (0.127) 
3rd quartile of trust  -0.081  -0.077  -0.089 
 
 (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.116) 
4th quartile of trust  0.218*  0.218*  0.211* 
 
 (0.111)  (0.120)  (0.109) 
Rule of law -0.186 -0.192     
 (0.164) (0.163)     
Accountability    0.165 0.168   
   (0.328) (0.324)   
Control of corruption     -0.156 -0.162 
     (0.139) (0.134) 
Observations 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 4,804 
R-squared 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 
Industry FEs, year FEs, firm FEs, country and firm controls in all regressions  
Notes: All independent variables are lagged one period. Country controls are GDP per capita, geographical 
distance, R&D as percentage of GDP, R&D policy incentives and corporate taxes. Firm controls are average 
salary in R&D, patents, labor productivity, market power, exporter, innovative R&D intensity, innovative 
indicator, average physical investment and industry internationalization. Rule of law reflects perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement and property rights. Accountability reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
can participate in selecting their government. Control of corruption reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain. For exact definitions and sources of all variables, see the Appendix of 
the paper. Estimated standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. All estimations are OLS. * 
p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%. 
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Table OA3: Robustness checks dropping countries considered to be tax havens 
Panel A: Dependent variable R&D imports from business group   
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) (7a) (8a) 
Trust -0.487  -0.422  -0.324  -1.608*  
 (0.565)  (0.489)  (0.466)  (0.801)  
2nd quartile of trust  -0.041  -0.041  -0.018  -0.127 
  (0.099)  (0.086)  (0.106)  (0.146) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.074  0.105  0.121  -0.419* 
  (0.056)  (0.072)  (0.088)  (0.219) 
4th quartile of trust  -0.353***  -0.462***  -0.364***  -0.157 
  (0.057)  (0.106)  (0.114)  (0.133) 
Observations 5,507 5,507 4,584 4,584 4,574 4,574 4,574 4,574 
R-squared 0.074 0.078 0.078 0.081 0.083 0.085 0.013 0.013 
Panel B: Dependent variable R&D imports from the international market 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) (7b) (8b) 
Trust 0.977***  0.828***  0.997***  0.952  
 (0.303)  (0.243)  (0.123)  (0.805)  
2nd quartile of trust  0.280***  0.271***  0.247**  0.186 
  (0.077)  (0.081)  (0.095)  (0.143) 
3rd quartile of trust  0.123***  0.087***  0.118**  -0.078 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.048)  (0.125) 
4th quartile of trust  0.297***  0.250***  0.240***  0.495** 
  (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.075)  (0.196) 
Observations 5,507 5,507 4,584 4,584 4,574 4,574 4,574 4,574 
R-squared 0.042 0.047 0.084 0.087 0.103 0.104 0.016 0.018 
Country controls   yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm controls     yes yes yes yes 
Firm FEs       yes yes 
Industry FEs and year FEs in all regressions 
Notes: All independent variables are lagged one period. Country controls are GDP per capita, geographical distance, R&D as percentage of GDP, R&D policy incentives and 
corporate taxes. Firm controls are average salary in R&D, patents, labor productivity, market power, exporter, innovative R&D intensity, innovative indicator, average 
physical investment and industry internationalization. For exact definitions and sources of all variables, see the Appendix of the paper. Estimated standard errors clustered at 
the country level are in parentheses. All estimations are OLS. * p < 10%, ** p < 5%, *** p < 1%. 
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Table OA4: Classification of R&D imports 
 Definition [1] R&D imports 
 
 
 
Acquisition of R&D services from abroad: Firm purchases (from abroad) of creative work on 
an occasional or regular basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge and its use to 
devise new and improved goods, services and processes from other companies (including 
other enterprises within the group) or public and private research organizations 
[1.1.] R&D imports from the group 
 
R&D acquisitions from companies located abroad that belong to the same business group 
[1.2] R&D imports from the market Acquisition of R&D from other companies located abroad (excluding other enterprises 
within the group) or public and private research organizations 
[1.2.1]  from foreign private firms R&D acquisitions from other private companies located abroad (excluding other enterprises 
within the group) 
[1.2.2]  from foreign universities R&D acquisitions from universities located abroad 
[1.2.3]  from other foreign sources R&D acquisitions from other sources (public administrations, foreign non-profit 
organizations and non-specified foreign sources) located abroad 
 
 
 
